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Abstract
A large chunk of research on the security issues of neural net-
works is focused on adversarial attacks. However, there exists a vast
sea of simpler attacks one can perform both against and with neural
networks. In this article, we give a quick introduction on how deep
learning in security works and explore the basic methods of exploita-
tion, but also look at the offensive capabilities deep learning enabled
tools provide. All presented attacks, such as backdooring, GPU-based
buffer overflows or automated bug hunting, are accompanied by short
open-source exercises for anyone to try out.
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1 Introduction
Disclaimer: This article and all the associated exercises are for
educational purposes only.
When one looks for information on exploiting neural networks or using
neural networks in an offensive manner, most of the articles and blog posts
are focused on adversarial approaches and only give a broad overview of how
to actually get them to work. These are certainly interesting and we will
investigate what ”adversarial” means and how to perform simplified versions
of these attacks, but our main focus will be on all the other methods that
are easy to understand and exploit.
Sadly, we can’t cover everything. The topics we do include here were cho-
sen because we feel they provide a good basis to understand more complex
methods and allow for easy to follow exercises. We begin with a quick in-
troduction to neural networks and move on to progressively harder subjects.
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The goal is to point out security issues, demystify some of the daunting as-
pects of deep learning and show that its actually really easy to get started
and mess around with neural networks.
Who its for: This article is aimed at anyone that is interested in deep
learning from a security perspective, be it the defender faced with a sudden
influx of applications utilizing neural networks, the attacker with access to a
machine running such an application or the CTF-participant who wants to
be prepared.
How to setup: To be able to work on the exercises, we need to prepare our
environment. For speed, it is advisable to use a computer with a modern
graphics card. We will also need:
1. Python and pip: Download and install Python3 and its package
installer pip using a package manager or directly from the website
https://www.python.org/downloads/.
2. Editor: An editor is required to work with the code, preferably one
that allows code highlighting for Python. Vim/Emacs will do. For
reference, all exercises were prepared using Visual Studio Code https:
//code.visualstudio.com/docs/python/python-tutorial.
3. Keras: Installing Keras can be tricky. We refer to the official installa-
tion guide at https://keras.io/#installation and suggest Tensor-
Flow as a backend (using the GPU-enabled version, if one is available
on the machine) as it is the most prevalent in industry [21].
4. NumPy, SciPy and scikit-image: NumPy and SciPy are excel-
lent helper packages, which are used throughout all exercises. Follow-
ing the official SciPy instructions should also install NumPy https:
//www.scipy.org/install.html. We will also need to install scikit-
image for image loading and saving: https://scikit-image.org/
docs/stable/install.html.
5. NLTK: NLTK provides functionalities for natural language processing
and is very helpful for some of the exercises. https://www.nltk.org/
install.html.
6. PyCuda: PyCuda is required for the GPU-based attack exercise. If
no nVidia GPU is available on the machine, this can be skipped https:
//wiki.tiker.net/PyCuda/Installation.
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What else to know:
• The exercises convey half of the content and it is recommended to at
least look at them and their solutions. While it is helpful to have a
good grasp of python, a lot of the exercises can be solved with basic
programming knowledge and some tinkering.
• All code is based on open-source deep learning code, which was modified
to work as an exercise. This is somewhat due to laziness, but mainly
because this is the actual process a lot developers follow: Find a paper
that seems to solve the problem, test out the reference implementation
and tweak it until it works. Where applicable, a reference is given in
the code itself to what it is based on.
• This is meant as a living document. Should an important reference be
missing or some critical error still be present in the text, please contact
the author.
1.1 Quick Guide to Neural Networks
In this section, we will take a quick dive into how and why neural networks
work, the general idea behind learning and everything we need to know to
move on to the next sections. We’ll take quite a different route compared
to most other introductions, focusing on intuition and less on rigor. If you
are familiar with the overall idea of deep learning, feel free to skip ahead.
As a better alternative to this introduction or as a supplement, we suggest
watching 3Blue1Brown’s YouTube series [53] on deep learning.
Let’s take a look at a single neuron. We can view it as a simple function
which takes a bunch of inputs x1, · · · , xn and generates an output f(~x).
Luckily, this function isn’t very complex:
z(~x) = w1x1 + · · ·+ wnxn + b , (1)
which is then put through something called an activation function a to get
the final output
f(~x) = a(z(~x)) . (2)
All the inputs xi are multiplied by the values wi, to which we refer to
as weights, and added up together with a bias b. The following activation
function a(·) basically acts as a gate-keeper. One of the most common such
activation functions is the ReLU [19][14], which has been, together with its
variants, in wide use since 2011. ReLU is just the a(·) = max(0, ·) function,
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which sets all negative outputs to 0 and leaves positive values unchanged, as
can be seen in Figure 1.
x
ReLU
Figure 1: The rectified linear unit.
In all we can thus write our neuron simply as
f(~x) = max(0, w1x1 + · · ·+ wnxn + b) . (3)
This is admittedly quite boring, so we will try to create something out of
it. Neurons can be connected in all sorts of ways. The output of one neuron
can be used as the input for another. This allows us to create all sorts of
functions by connecting these neurons. As an example, we will use the hat
function, which has a small triangular hat at some point and is 0 almost
everywhere else, as shown in Figure 2.
x
h(x)
Figure 2: A single hat function.
We can write down the equation for this function as follows:
hi = max
(
0, 1−max
(
0,
ci − x
ci − ci−1
)
−max
(
0,
x− ci
ci+1 − ci
))
. (4)
By comparing this with Equation 3, we can see that this is equivalent to
connecting three neurons as in Figure 3 and setting the weights and biases
to the correct values by hand. We often refer to a group of neurons as a
layer, where those that connect to the input are the input (first) layer, the
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neurons that connect to the input layer are the second layer and so forth, up
until the last one that produces an output, also known as the output layer.
Every layer that is neither an input or an output layer is also referred to as
a hidden layer.
OutputInput
h(x)
Figure 3: A hat function h(x) represented by 3 neurons and their connections.
In essence, this is our first neural network that takes some value x as
input and returns 1 if it is exactly ci or something less than 1 or even 0 if it
is not (we can see this by plugging in values by hand or taking a look back
at Figure 2). Essentially, we made an ci detector, as that is the only value
that returns 1. Again, not very exciting.
The beauty of hat functions, however, is that we can simply add up
multiple copies of them create a piecewise linear approximation of some other
function g(x), as shown in Figure 4. All that needs to be done is to choose
g(c1), · · · , g(cn) as the height of each hat function peak.
x
hi(x)
x
hi+1(x)
x
f(x)
ai ai+1
·g(ai)
·g(ai+1)
+
Figure 4: Piecewise approximation of some arbitrary function (blue) using
multiple hat functions (red).
This is equivalent to having the neural network shown in Figure 5, with
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all the weights and biases set to the appropriate values. Again, this is all
still done by hand, which is not what we actually want.
Outputf(x)Input OutputInput
...
h1
h2
Figure 5: Approximation of a non-linear block (left) by a network of classical
neurons with ReLU activation functions (right). The individual hat functions
are highlighted as red dashed rectangles and aggregated using an additional
neuron.
This idea can be easily extended to higher-dimensional hat functions with
multiple inputs and multiple outputs (As an example, see the case of two
outputs in Figure 6). Doing this allows us to construct a neural network that
can approximate any function. As a matter of fact, the more neurons we add
to this network, the closer we can get to the function we want to approximate.
In essence we have explored how neural networks can be universal function
approximators [8].
Output 1
Input
Output 2
...
...
hi
h˜i
Figure 6: Example of a single hat function (red, dashed) being reused (blue,
dotted) to produce a different output.
But everything discussed so far is not how neural networks are designed
and constructed. In reality, neurons are connected and then trained, without
knowing the actual function g(~x) we’ve used thus far. The training process
essentially takes a bunch of data and attempts to find the best weights and
biases to approximate this data by itself, replacing our hand-designed ap-
proach. In general, these weights and biases will not resemble hat functions
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or anything similar. But, as we are still using ReLU, the final function de-
scribed by a network that was trained instead of hand-designed, will still
look like a piecewise linear interpolation. It just happens that the training
process automatically found optimal support points (similar to those of our
hat functions) based on the training data.
Let’s describe this training process in more detail. It relies on a mathe-
matical tool called backpropagation [15]. Imagine neural networks and back-
propagation as an assembly line of untrained workers that want to build
a smartphone. The last employee (layer) of this assembly line only knows
what the output should be, but not how to get there. He looks at a fin-
ished smartphone (output) and deduces that he needs some screen and some
”back” element that holds the screen. So, he turns to the employee that is
just to his left and tells him: ”You need to produce a screen and a back
element”. This employee, knowing nothing, says ”sure”, looks at these two
things and tries to break it down even further. He turns to his left to tell
the next employee, that he needs ”a piece of glass, a shiny metal and some
rubber” and that neighbor will say ”sure”. This goes on all the way through
the assembly line to the last employee, who is totally confused how he should
get his hands on ”a diamond, a car and some bronze swords”, if all he has
is copper, silicon and glass (inputs). He won’t say ”sure”, as he can’t make
what his neighbor wants. So he tells him what he can make. At this point,
the foreman will step in and tell them to start the process over, but to keep
in mind what they learned the first time around. Over time, the assembly
line employees will slowly figure a way out that works.
So how does backpropagation really work? The idea is to have a measure
of how well the current model approximates the ”true” data. This measure is
called the loss function. Assume we have a training pair of inputs ~x and the
corresponding correct outputs ~y. This can be an image (~x) and what type of
object it is (~y). Now, when we input ~x into our neural network model, we get
some output ~˜y, which is most likely very different to the correct value ~y, if
we haven’t trained it yet. The loss function l assigns a value to the difference
between the true ~y and the one our model calculates at this exact moment ~˜y.
How we define this loss is up to us and will have different effects on training
later on. A simple example for a loss function is the square loss
l(~y, ~˜y) = (~y − ~˜y)2 . (5)
It makes sense to rewrite this in a slightly different way. Let’s use f to
denote our neural network model and ~θ = [w0, · · · , wn, b0, · · · , bm] to be a
vector of all our weights and biases. We write ~˜y = f(~x|~θ) to mean that our
model produces the output ~˜y from inputs ~x based on the weights and biases
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~θ. In our example, this is equivalent to the foreman complaining: ”If you
continue with your work in this way (~θ), the smartphones you produce (~˜y)
from this set of raw materials (~x) will look only 25% (l) like the smartphone
we are meant to produce (~y).”
We, however, have a lot of data points (~xi, ~yi) and want some quantity
that measures how the neural network performs on these as a whole, where
some might fit better than others. This is called the cost function C(~θ),
which again depends on the model parameters. The most obvious would be
to simply add up all the square losses of the individual data points and take
the mean value. As a matter of fact, that is exactly what happens with the
mean squared error (MSE):
MSE(~θ) =
1
n
n∑
i
(~yi − f(~xi|~θ))2 = 1
n
n∑
i
l(~y, f(~xi|~θ)) . (6)
As the name suggests, the cost measures the mean of all the individual
losses. In our example, this is equivalent to the foreman calculating how bad
the employees have performed over an entire batch of smartphones. Note
that it is quite typical to write the cost function name MSE instead of C.
Further, because they are so similar in nature, in a lot of articles the words
”loss” and ”cost” are used interchangeably and it becomes clear from context
which is meant.
Again, this cost function measures how far off we are with our model,
based on the current weights and biases ~θ we are using. Ideally, if we have
a cost of 0, that would mean we are as close as possible with our model to
the training data. This, however, is seldom possible. Instead, we will settle
for parameters ~θ that minimize the cost as much as possible and our goal is
to change our weights and biases in such a way, that the value of the cost
function goes down. Let’s take a look at the simplest case and pretend that
we only have a single parameter in ~θ. In this case, we can imagine the cost
as a simple function over a single variable, say one single weight w, as shown
in Figure 7.
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wC(w)
w˜a w˜b
Figure 7: An example cost function C for the simplest case of a single weight
parameter w. We find at least two local minima w˜a and w˜b, where w˜a might
even be a global minimum.
From the graph we see that we achieve the lowest cost if our weight has
a value of w˜a. However, in reality, we don’t see this graph. In order to draw
this graph, we had to compute the cost for every possible value of w. This
is fine for a single variable, but our neural network might have millions of
weights and biases. There isn’t enough compute power in the world to try
out every single value combination for millions of such parameters.
There is another solution to our problem. Consider Figure 8.
w
C(w)
Start
Figure 8: Instead of looking for the minimum by checking all values individ-
ually, we begin at some point (start) and move ”downhill” (red arrows) until
we reach a minimum.
Let’s pretend we started with some value of w that isn’t at the minimal
cost and we have no idea where it might be. What we do know is that the
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minimal cost is at the lowest point. If we can measure the slope at the point
we are at at the moment, then at least we know in what direction we need
to move in order to reduce our cost. And if we keep repeating this process,
i.e., measuring the slope and going ”downhill”, we should reach the lowest
point at some stage.
This should be familiar from calculus. Measuring the slope in respect to
some variable is nothing more than taking the derivative. In our case, that
is ∂C(w)
∂w
. Let’s rewrite this in terms of all parameters ~θ and introduce the
gradient
∇C(~θ) =
[
∂C(~θ)
∂w0
, · · · , ∂C(
~θ)
∂wn
,
∂C(~θ)
∂b0
, · · · , ∂C(
~θ)
∂bm
]
. (7)
To find better parameters that reduce the cost function, we simply move
a tiny step of size α into the direction with the steepest gradient (going
downhill the fastest). The equation for which looks like this:
~θ (new) = ~θ (old) − α · ∇C(~θ (old)) . (8)
This is called gradient descent, which is an optimization method. There
are hundreds of variations of this method, which may vary the step size α
(also known as the learning rate) or do other fancy things. Each of these
optimizers has a name (Adam [28], RMSProp [23], etc.) and can be found in
most deep learning libraries, but the exact details aren’t important for this
article.
Using gradient descent, however, does not guarantee we find the lowest
possible cost (also known as the global minimum). Instead, if we take a look
at Figure 9, we see that we might get stuck in some valley that isn’t the
lowest minimum, but only a local minimum. Finding the global minimum is
probably the largest unsolved challenge in machine learning and can play a
role in the upcoming exercises.
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wC(w)
Start
Figure 9: We started at a point that leads us to a local minimum. We might
get stuck there and never even know that it is just a local minimum and not
a global one.
Next, all we need to do is to calculate ∇C(~θ), which is done iteratively
by backpropagation. We won’t go into the exact detail of the algorithm, as
it is quite technical, but rather try to give some intuitive understanding of
what is happening. At first, finding the derivative of C seems daunting, as it
entails finding the derivative of the entire neural network. Let’s assume we
have a single input x, a single output y and a single neuron with activation
function a and weight w with no bias, i.e., the example we have been working
with so far. We want to find ∂C(w)
∂w
, which seems hard. But, notice that C
contains our model f = a(w · x), which means we can apply the chain rule
in respect to a:
∂C(w)
∂w
=
∂C(w)
∂a
∂a
∂w
. (9)
This is quite a bit easier to solve. As a matter of fact, if we are using the
MSE cost, we quickly find the derivative of Equation 6 to be
∂C(w)
∂a
= (y − a) . (10)
Now we just need to find ∂a
∂w
. Recall that we introduced z = ~w · ~x + b as an
intermediary step in a neuron (Equation 1), which is the value just before it
is piped through an activation function a. For our case we just have z = wx.
We use the chain rule again, but this time in respect to z:
∂a
∂w
=
∂a
∂z
∂z
∂w
. (11)
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We find that ∂a
∂z
is just the derivative of the ReLU activation function, which
we can look up:
∂a
∂z
=
{
0 for x ≤ 0
1 for x > 0
(12)
and ∂z
∂w
= x (we ignore the ”minor” detail that obviously ReLU isn’t differ-
entiable at 0...). Multiplying it all together and we have found our gradient!
Now, what happens when we add more layers to the neural network?
Well, our derivative ∂z
∂w
will no longer just be x, but rather, it will be the
activation function of the lower layer, i.e., ∂z
∂w
= a(lower layer)(· · · )! From there,
we basically start back at ∂a
∂w
, just with the values of the lower layer. This in
essence is the reason why this algorithm is called backpropagation. We start
at the last layer and, in a sense, optimize beginning from the back. Now,
apart from going deeper, we can also add more weights to each neuron and
more neurons to each layer. This doesn’t change anything really. We only
need to keep track of more and more indices and we have our backpropagation
algorithm.
When designing a neural network and deciding upon how long and with
what parameters to run the optimizer, we need to keep in mind the concept
of under- and overfitting. Figure 10 should give some intuition what both
these terms mean.
(a) Underfitting (b) Robust (c) Overfitting
Figure 10: Piecewise approximation of some arbitrary function (blue) using
multiple hat functions (red).
If, for example, our model just doesn’t have enough neurons to approxi-
mate the function, the optimizer will try its best to come up with something
that is close enough, but just doesn’t represent the data well enough (under-
fitting). As another example, if we have a model that has more than enough
parameters available and we train it on data far too long, the optimizer will
get too good at fitting to the data, so much so, that the neural network
almost acts like a look-up table (overfitting). Ideally, we want something in
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between under- and overfitting. However, in later sections we will see, that
for our purposes, it isn’t necessarily bad to overfit.
This wraps up the very basics of neural networks we are going to cover
and we move one level higher to see what we can do with them from a network
architecture point-of-view. Roughly speaking, we can perform two different
tasks with a network, regression and classification:
• Regression allows us to uncover the relation between input variables
and do predictions and interpolations based on them. A classical ex-
ample would be predicting stock prices. Generally, the result of a re-
gression analysis is some vector of continuous values.
• Classification allows us to classify what category a set of inputs might
belong to. Here, a typical example is the classification of what object
is in an image. The result of this analysis is a vector of probabilities in
the range of 0 and 1, ideally the sum of which is exactly 1 (also referred
to as a multinomial distribution).
Thus far, our introduction of neural networks has covered how regression
works. To do classification, we need just a few more ingredients. Obviously,
we want our output to be a vector of mainly 0s and 1s. Using ReLU on the
hidden layers is fine, but problematic on the last layer, as it isn’t bounded
and doesn’t guarantee that the output vector sums to 1. For this purpose,
we have the softmax function
softmax(z0, · · · , zj)i = e
zi∑n
j e
zj
. (13)
It is quite different to all other activation functions, as it depends on all
z values from all the output neurons, not just its own. But it has to, as
otherwise it can’t normalize the output vector to add up to be exactly 1.
Even with softmax in place, training this model would be problematic.
The loss function we have used thus far, MSE, is ill suited for this task, as
miss-classifications aren’t penalized enough. We need some loss that takes
into account that we are comparing a multinomial distribution. Luckily,
there exists a loss function that does exactly that, namely the cross-entropy
loss
l(~y, f(~xi|~θ)) = −~y · log(f(~xi|~θ)) . (14)
The exact details why the loss is the way it is, isn’t important for our pur-
poses. We recommend Aure´lien Ge´ron’s video [17] on the subject as an easy
to understand explanation for the interested reader.
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With the basic differences between classification and regression covered,
we move on to the different types of layers found in a neural network. So far
we have covered what is called a dense layer, i.e., every neuron of one layer
is connected to (almost) every neuron of the next layer. These are perfectly
fine and in theory, we are able to do everything with just these types of
layers. However, having a deep network of nothing more than dense layers
greatly decreases the performance while training and when using it later on.
Instead, using some intuition and reasoning, a lot of new types of layers were
introduced that reduced the number of connections to a fraction. In our
motivation using hat functions, we saw that it is possible to do quite a lot
without connecting every neuron with every other neuron.
Let’s take the example of image classification. Images are comprised of
a lot of pixels. Even if we just have a small image of size 28 × 28, we are
already looking at 784 pixels. For a dense layer and just a single neuron
for each pixel, we are already looking at 614656 connections, i.e., 614656
different weights, for a single layer. But we can be a bit smarter about this.
We can make the assumption, that each pixel has to be seen in context to the
neighboring pixels, but not those far away. So, instead of connecting each of
the neurons to every pixel, we just connect the neurons to one pixel and the
8 surrounding ones. We still have 784 neurons, but reduced the amount of
weights to 784 × 8 = 7056, as each neuron is only connected to 9 pixels in
total.
In some sense, we have made 28 × 28 small 3 × 3 regions inside of the
image. That’s still a lot. We can aggregate these results and subsample by
a factor of 2, so that the following layer only needs 14 × 14 neurons. Now,
we repeat this process and connect these 14× 14 to 3× 3 of the neurons of
the previous layer. In essence, we are relating the small 3× 3 regions of the
input image to other such regions (See Figure 11 for an illustration). We then
subsample some more and are left with a grid of 7 × 7 neurons (depending
on the padding we used). With so few neurons left, it is computationally not
too expensive to start adding dense layers from this point onwards.
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Figure 11: A typical convolutional neural network. Image by Aphex34
(https://en.wikipedia.org/).
What we described here are called convolutional layers [32] and the small
regions they process are their filters and the result of each filter is referred to
as a feature. In our construction we only added one neuron for each filter, but
it is perfectly fine to add more. This entire process, including subsampling
can be seen in Figure 11. What we described as subsampling is also often
referred to as pooling or down-sampling. There are different methods to
perform subsampling, such as max-pooling [66], which just takes the largest
value in some grid.
Convolutional layers are de-facto standard in image classification and
have found their use in non-image related tasks, such as text classification.
The development of new architectures using convolutional layers is too rapid
to name them all. There have, however, been a lot of milestones worth
mentioning and looking into, such as LeNet [33], AlexNet [29], GoogleNet
[61] and ResNet [22].
So far, we have looked at purely feed-forward networks, which take an
input, process it and produce an output. However, we want to mention
what happens when we have a network that takes some input, processes
it and produces an output, but then continues taking inputs for processing
and always ”remembers” what it did at the last step. This remembering is
equivalent to passing on some hidden state to the next step. A schematic
illustration of such a network is found in Figure 12. This type of network
is called a recurrent neural network (RNN). By passing on a hidden state,
this network is ideal for sequence data. As such, they are commonplace in
natural language processing (NLP), where the network begins by processing
a word or sentence and passes on the information to the next part of the
network when it looks at the following word or sentence. After all, we do not
forget the beginning of a sentence while reading it.
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Figure 12: The general structure of recurrent neural networks. Image by
Franc¸ois Deloche (https://en.wikipedia.org/).
One of the first and most famous type of RNN is the long-short term mem-
ory (LSTM) [25], which is the basis for a lot of newer models, such as Seq2Seq
[59] for translating/converting sequences of text into other sequences.
1.2 How it works
Before we begin to dive into some attack methods, here is a quick breakdown
of a couple of the more interesting security implementations that employ
neural networks. There are, of course, many more applications apart from
those listed in the following. Network scanners, web application firewalls and
more can all be implemented with at least some part using deep learning. The
ones we discuss here are interesting, as the methods and exercises presented
in later sections are mainly aimed at toy versions of their actual real-life
counter-part.
We won’t go deep into each application, but rather discuss one specific
implementation for each. For a review of deep learning methods found in
cyber security, we refer to the survey by Berman et al. [3]. Isao Takaesu, the
author of DeepExploit we highlight in this section, also has a more in-depth
course on the defensive aspects of machine learning [63].
1.2.1 Biometric Scanners
There are a lot of different biometric scanners. We will be looking at iris
scanners for security access (i.e., one that tells us ”access” or ”no access”)
based on deep learning. The naive approach to implementing such a scanner
would be to train a CNN on a large set of irises for ”access” and another for
”no access”.
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This type of approach would have multiple problems, some of which will
become clear through the exercises later on. From a practical standpoint
alone, this would be unfeasible, as each new person who needs his iris to
grant ”access” would require the neural network to be re-trained.
A more sensible solution is presented by Spetlik and Razumenic [57]. An
overview of the architecture is found in Figure 13.
Figure 13: Iris verification with IrisMatch-CNN. Two irises are detected and
normalized. The normalized irises are fed into the Unit-Circle (U-C) layers.
The responses from the U-C layers are concatenated and fed into the Matcher
convolutional network. A single scalar is produced – the probability of a
match. Two irises match if the probability is greater than a given threshold.
Figure and description from [57].
The description of Figure 13 should yield some familiar terms. In essence
the iris is broken down into a set of features (we can think of them like,
iris color, deformations, etc.) using their U-C layers, which are their custom
version of convolutional layers. This is done for the input iris from the current
scan and a reference iris stored in some database. The resulting features from
both these irises are then both fed through another convolutional network,
the matcher. As the name implies, this CNN is responsible for matching the
input iris to the reference based on the features and produce a single output
value: match (1) or no match (0).
The major advantage of this approach is, that it only needs to be trained
once, as the network itself doesn’t grant access, but rather checks if two
irises match. Adding new irises, thus, only requires adding it to the reference
database.
However, it still needs to be trained to be able to extract features from
an image of an iris and to perform matching. Luckily, there are available
datasets for iris images available online, such as CASIA-IrisV4 [1].
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1.2.2 Intrusion Detection
Most modern approaches to intrusion detection systems are indeed based
on combinations of machine learning methods [13], such as support vector
machines [34], nearest neighbors [35] and now deep learning. We will be
focusing on the implementation by Shone et al. [56].
Intrusion detection systems need to be fast to handle large volumes of
network data, especially if they are meant for a real-time application instead
of forensics. Any deep learning implementation should therefore be compact.
However, it must still be able to handle the diversity of the data and protocols
found in a network.
Figure 14: The proposed intrusion detection architecture. Figure from [56].
The architecture proposed by Shone et al. shown in Figure 14 is compact
enough to do fast computations. The overall idea is to use a neural network to
take the 41 input features of the KDD1999/NSL-KDD dataset [52][12] found
in Table 1 and encode them into a smaller set of 28 features, which are better
suited for classification using a different machine learning method, random
forest. In other words, the neural network is used basically to pre-processes
the data.
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1 duration 22 is guest login
2 protocol type 23 count
3 service 24 srv count
4 flag 25 serror rate
5 src bytes 26 srv serror rate
6 dst bytes 27 rerror rate
7 land 28 srv rerror rate
8 wrong fragment 29 same srv rate
9 urgent 30 diff srv rate
10 hot 31 srv diff host rate
11 num failed logins 32 dst host count
12 logged in 33 dst host srv count
13 num compromised 34 dst host same srv rate
14 root shell 35 dst host diff srv rate
15 su attempted 36 dst host same src port rate
16 num root 37 dst host srv diff host rate
17 num file creations 38 dst host serror rate
18 num shells 39 dst host srv serror rate
19 num access files 40 dst host rerror rate
20 num outbound cmds 41 dst host srv rerror rate
21 is host login
Table 1: Features of the network data found in the KDD1999 dataset [52].
This idea of encoding the input features into something that is easier
to work with is common in deep learning and we saw that the iris scanner
essentially did the same with its feature extractor.
Let’s focus on the datasets used for training. From the table of features
for the KDD1999/NSL-KDD dataset, it should be clear that this is a very
shallow inspection of network traffic, where the packet’s content is largely
ignored. From the architecture we know inspection happens on a per-packet
basis. This allows us draw some first conclusions: It does not take into
account the context the packet was send in (”is this well-formed but unusual
user behavior?”) and the timing (”is it a beacon?”).
Our main takeaway here is, that without deeper knowledge of what the
layers do and how random forest works, we are already able to formulate
possible attack plans, just by looking at the architecture and the training
data. In contrast, were we to find LSTM layers in the neural network’s ar-
chitecture, it would give some indication that the system might be analyzing
sequences of packets, possibly making it context-sensitive and mitigating our
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planned attack path.
Newer datasets, such as CICIDS2017 [12], use pcap files. These reflect real
world scenarios more accurately. CICIDS2017 contains the network behavior
data for 25 targets going about their daily business or facing an actual attack.
These attacks include all sorts of possible attack vectors, such as a DoS or
an SQL injection. While this dataset does not cover the entire MITRE
ATT&CK Matrix [7], it does provide enough hints at what neural network
based NIDS are possibly looking for.
1.2.3 Anti-Virus
Anti-Virus software is another prominent type of application that utilizes
machine learning. As previously, we follow a specific implementation for our
discussion. Here we use the deep learning architecture proposed in [47].
The approach they chose was to identify malicious code by what API calls
it makes and in what order. To apply deep learning to this method, the API
calls the code makes need to be preprocessed into a representation a neural
network can understand. For this, one can use a vector, where each element
in the vector represents one type of API call. We set all the elements of that
vector to 0, except for the element that represents the API call made at the
moment, which we set to 1. This is also referred to as one hot encoding.
Now, with a sequence of API calls represented as a sequence of one-
hot encoded vectors, we can feed these into an RNN for classification. The
proposed architecture by Pascanu et al. is found in Figure 15.
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Figure 15: An RNN for malware classification. Figure from [47].
What is interesting to note here, is that the dataset the proposed RNN
was trained on was not published with the paper. This is often both a security
measure (as we will see in the exercises, having access to the training set can
be very helpful for bypassing) or a matter of keeping an advantage over the
competition.
However, there are publicly available datasets, such as the Microsoft’s
malware classification challenge [51] posted on Kaggle [27] (note that the
paper that did not publish its dataset is also from Microsoft).
Kaggle itself is an interesting resource. It is a platform for corporations or
institutions to post machine learning challenges, where anyone can try their
hand at coming up with the best algorithm to perform the task and win
substantial prizes. Such challenges can be anything from predicting stock
prices based on news data to, as we saw here, classifying malware.
Every challenge must of course provide some data for the participant to
test their method on. Furthermore, the models the participants provide are
often public. This is where it becomes interesting for the security expert. On
the one hand, one can study the methods others come up with in order to
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solve a problem, on the other hand, one can look at the problem itself and
the dataset to deduce security implications. What features are available in
the dataset? Is it a sequence of data or individual data points? As we saw
earlier in our intrusion detection case, this knowledge will come in handy.
1.2.4 Translators
It might seem strange that after biometric scanners, intrusion detection sys-
tems and anti-virus we now turn to language translation. The first three
have obvious security implications, but translation?
Well, it turns out that deep learning based language translators are quite
interesting both from a defensive standpoint, as well as an offensive stand-
point. We will be looking at both these cases in the exercises. For now, let’s
assume we have a website with a chatbot running, but the developer was too
lazy to localize it into all languages. Instead, the developer simply wrote the
chatbot in english and slapped a translator neural network on top.
The almost classical translator to use is the Sequence to Sequence (Seq2Seq)
model [59]. Seq2Seq is based on LSTM and maps a sequence of characters
to another sequence of characters, depending on what it was trained on. An
english sentence can be mapped to a german sentence using this model, a
schematic view of which is shown in Figure 16.
Figure 16: The model reads an input sequence ”ABC” and produces
”WXYZ” as the output sequence. The model stops making predictions after
outputting the end-of-sentence token. Figure and description from [59].
Translators are interesting, because they might not seem security relevant
to the person implementing it on a website or similar. In our discussion, it
shall serve as an example of a non-security related deep learning tool which
we exploit in a later exercise.
1.2.5 Offensive Tools
The final area we want to highlight that has started to incorporate deep
learning is automated penetration testing. Specifically, we will take a short
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look at DeepExploit created by Isao Takaesu at Mitsui Bussan Secure Direc-
tions [62]. While it won’t make an appearance in the exercises, we include it
as it is probably the most interesting use of deep learning in offensive security
so far.
DeepExploit performs the typical chain of intelligence gathering, exploita-
tion, post-exploitation, lateral movement and report generation fully auto-
matic. It does this by generating commands for Metasploit [50], which per-
forms the actual execution.
While not all steps in the chain utilize machine learning, the information
gathering and main exploitation phase do. For example, DeepExploit is able
to analyze HTTP responses using machine learning to predict what kind of
stack is deployed on the target.
But the truly interesting part comes from the exploitation phase. In
Figure 17 an overview of the training process is shown. DeepExploit uses re-
inforcement learning [60] to improve its exploitation capability and is trained
asynchronously [42] on multiple training servers. In reinforcement learning
one doesn’t have a training set, but rather one lets an agent explore a huge
amount of possible actions. A reward function tells the agent if the chosen
actions were successful or not and it learns from these and is able to repeat
and modify them in the future, should a similar situation arise.
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Figure 17: An overview of the training process for DeepExploit. Figure from
Isao Takaesu’s presentation at Black Hat USA 2018 Arsenal [62].
2 Methods
In the following we introduce some of the methods that can be used to
exploit neural networks or incorporated into an offensive tool. We tried to
structure the order of these methods by category and increasing difficulty of
the exercises. Holt gives a nice and accessible survey of related methods in
[26].
2.1 Attacking Weights and Biases
Let’s assume we have gained partial access to an iris scanner which we want
to bypass. While we can’t access any of the code, we have full access to the
’model.h5’ file, which holds all the information for a neural network.
The first thing to note is that the ’model.h5’ file is using a Hierarchical
Data Format (HDF5) [18], which is a common format to store the the model
information and also data. There are other formats to store this in, such
as pure JSON, but for illustrative purposes we will stick to HDF5. Further,
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as this file format is used in many different applications apart from deep
learning, tools to view and edit are easy to find.
As HDF5 files can become quite large, it is not uncommon to have a
separate source control for these files or store them in a different location
compared to the source code in production. This can lead to the scenario
presented here, where someone forgot to employ the same security measures
to both environments.
Having access to the model file is almost as good as having access to code
or a configuration file. Keras [6], for example, uses the model file to store
the entire neural network architecture, including all the weights and biases.
Thus, we are able to modify the behavior of the network by doing careful
edits.
A biometric scanner employing neural networks will most likely be doing
classification. This can be a simple differentiation between ”Access Granted”
and ”Access Denied”, or a more complex identification of the individual being
scanned, such as ”Henry B.”, ”Monica K.” and ”Unknown”. Obviously we
want to trick the model into misclassifying whatever fake identification we
throw at it by changing the HDF5 file.
There are of course restrictions to what we can modify in this file without
breaking anything. It should be obvious that changing the amounts of inputs
or outputs a model has will most likely break the code that uses the neural
network. Adding or removing layers can also lead to some strange effects,
such as errors occurring when the code tries to modify certain hyperparam-
eters.
We are, however, always free to change the weights and biases. It won’t
make much sense to try and fiddle around with just any values, because at
the time of writing, the field of deep learning still lacks a good understanding
and interpretation of the individual weights and biases in most layers. For
the last layer in a network, however, things get a bit easier. Take a look at
the network snapshot in Figure 18.
~w = (0.2, 0.5, 1.2) b = 0.7
~w = (−0.5, 0.4,−0.3) b = −0.1 100000.0
Figure 18: A neural network with one of the output’s bias set to a very
high value, which completely overshadows the contribution from the weights
multiplied by the input.
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Here we spiked the bias for one of the final neurons in a classification
network. By using such a high value, we almost guarantee that the classifier
will always mislabel every input with that class. If that class is our ”Access
Granted”, any input we show it, including some crudely crafted fake iris,
will get us in. Alternatively, we can also set all weights and biases of the
last layer to 0.0 and only keep the bias of our target neuron at 1.0. Which
method to choose depends on how stealthy it should be.
Generally, this sort of attack works on every neural network doing clas-
sification, if we have full access to the model. It is also possible to perform
this type of attack on a hardware level [4]. For a more advanced version of
directly attacking the weights and biases in a network, we also refer to the
work by Dumford and Scheirer [10].
Blue-Team: Treat the model file like you would a database storing sensi-
tive data, such as passwords. No unnecessary read or write access, perhaps
encrypting it. Even if the model isn’t for a security related application, the
contents could still represent the intellectual property of the organization.
Exercise 0-0: Analyze the provided ’model.h5’ file and answer a set of
multiple choice questions.
→ https://github.com/Kayzaks/HackingNeuralNetworks/tree/master/
0_LastLayerAttack
Exercise 0-1: Modify a ’model.h5’ file and force the neural network to
produce a specific output.
→ https://github.com/Kayzaks/HackingNeuralNetworks/tree/master/
0_LastLayerAttack
2.2 Backdooring Neural Networks
We continue with the scenario from the previous section. However, our goal
now is to be far more subtle. Modifying a classifier to always return the
same label is a very loud approach to breaking security measures. Instead,
we want the biometric scanner to classify everything as usual, except for a
single image: Our backdoor.
Being subtle is often necessary, as such security systems will have checks
in place to avoid someone simply modifying the network. But, these security
checks can never be thorough and cover the entire input spectrum for the
network. Generally, it will simply check the results for some test set and
verify that these are still correctly classified. If our backdoor is sufficiently
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different from this unknown test set (an orange iris for example), we should
be fine.
Note that when choosing a backdoor, it is advisable to not choose some-
thing completely different. Using an image of a cat as a backdoor for an iris
scanner can cause problems, as most modern systems begin by performing
a sanity check on the input, making sure that it is indeed an iris. This is
usually separate from the actual classifier we are trying to evade. But, of
course, if we have access to this system as well, anything goes.
At first glance it would seem that we need to train the model again from
scratch and incorporate the backdoor into the training set. This will work,
but having access to the entire training set the target was trained on is often
not the case. Instead, we can simply continue training the model as it is in
its current form, using the backdoor we have.
There really isn’t much more to poisoning a neural network. Generally
all the important information, such as what loss function was used or what
optimizer, is stored in the model file itself. We just have to be careful of
some of the side effects this can have. Continuing training with a completely
different training set may cause catastrophic forgetting [40], especially con-
sidering our blunt approach. This basically means, that the network may
loose the ability to correctly classify images it was able to earlier. When this
happens, security checks against the network might fail, signaling that the
system has been tempered with.
If the model does not contain the loss function, optimizer or any other
parameters used for training, things can get a bit trickier. If we are faced
with such a situation, our best bet is to be as minimally invasive as possible
(very small learning rate, conservative loss function and optimizer) and stop
as soon as we are satisfied the backdoor works. This must be done, as modern
deep learning revolves a lot around crafting the perfect loss function and it
is entirely possible that this information is inaccessible to us. We will, thus,
slide into some unintended minima very quickly, amplifying the side effects
mentioned earlier.
Exercise 1-0: Modify a neural network for image classification and force it
to classify a backdoor image with a label of choice, without miss-classifying
the test set.
→ https://github.com/Kayzaks/HackingNeuralNetworks/tree/master/
1_Backdooring
Now, apart from further training a model, if we have access to some
developer machine with the actual training data, we can of course simply
inject our backdoor there and let the developer train the model for us.
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In [5], Chen et al. introduce the idea of data poisoning and backdooring
neural networks. We also refer to [38] for another, more advanced version of
this attack. Furthermore, for PyTorch,
Blue-Team: There are methods designed to mitigate the effects of back-
dooring and poisoning, such as fine-pruning [37] and AUROR [55]. However,
most methods are aimed at the initial training process and not at models
in production. One quick to implement measure is to perform sanity checks
against the neural network using negative examples periodically. Make sure
that false inputs return a negative result and try to avoid testing positive
inputs or else you might have another source of possible compromise.
2.3 Extracting Information
Neural networks, in some sense, have a ”memory” of what they have been
trained on. If we think back to our introduction and Figure 10, the network
stores a graph that sits on or somewhere in between the data points. If we
only have that graph, it seems possible to make guesses at to where these
data points might have been in the first place. Again, take Figure 10 and
think away the data points. We would be quite close to the truth by assuming
that choosing random points slightly above or below the graph would yield
actual data points the network was trained on.
In other words, we should be able to extract information from the neural
network that has some resemblance to the data it was trained on. Under
certain circumstances, this turns out to be true, such Hayes et al. [20] and
Hitaj et al. [24] have shown, with both groups leveraging Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GANs). This is actually quite a big privacy and security
problem. Being able to extract images a neural network was trained on can
be a nightmare.
However, this is only true to some extent. As neural networks are able to
generalize and are mostly trained on sparse data, the process of extracting
the original training set is quite fuzzy and generates a lot of false-positives.
I.e., we will end up with a lot of examples that certainly would pass through
the neural network as intended, but not resemble the original training data
in the slightest.
While the process of extracting information that closely resembles the
original data is interesting in itself, for us it is perfectly sufficient to generate
these incorrect samples. We don’t need the exact image of the CEO to bypass
facial recognition, we only require an image that the neural network thinks
is the CEO. Luckily, these are quite easy to generate.
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We can actually train a network to do exactly this, by misusing the power
of backpropagation. Recall that backpropagation begins at the back of the
network and subsequently ”tells” each layer how to modify itself to generate
the output the next one requires. Now, if we take an existing network and
simply add some layers in-front of it, we can use backpropagation to tell these
layers how to generate the inputs it needs to produce a specific output. We
just need to make sure to not change the original network and only let the
new layers train, as shown in Figure 19.
Figure 19: We connect a single layer of new neurons (blue, dashed) in front
of an existing network (red, dashed). We only train the new neurons and
keep the old network unchanged.
For illustration, recall the assembly line example from our introduction.
We have a trained assembly line that creates smartphones from raw materials.
As an attacker, we want to know exactly how much of each material this
company uses to create a single smartphone. Our approach above is similar
to sneakily adding an employee to the front of the assembly and let him ask
his neighbor what and how much material he should pass to him (learning
through backpropagation).
Exercise 2-0: Given an image classifier, extract an image sample that will
create a specific output.
→ https://github.com/Kayzaks/HackingNeuralNetworks/tree/master/
2_ExtractingInformation
Blue-Team: Think about cryptographic methods [9][43], such as encrypting
your model/data and secure computing. See also Jason Mancuso’s talk at
DEFCON 27 AI Village [39].
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2.4 Brute-Forcing
Brute-forcing should be reserved for when all other methods have failed.
However, when it comes to breaking neural networks, a lot of approaches
somewhat resemble brute-forcing. After all, training itself is simply showing
the network a very large set of examples and have it learn in a ”brute-force”
type of manner. But here we are truly talking about brute-forcing a target
network over a wire in the classical sense, instead of training it locally.
Just as brute-forcing a password, we can use something similar to a dic-
tionary attack. A dictionary attack assumes that the user used normal words
and patterns as part of the password and we can do the same for neural net-
works. The idea is to start with some input that seems reasonable and could
possibly grant access and slightly modifying it until we get in.
Let’s take the iris scanner as an example again. If we know the CEO’s
iris works and know that he or she has blue eyes, but don’t have an actual
picture, we begin with any image of a blue iris of some random person and
start modifying it until we get in. This might seem difficult, how does one
modify an iris to match and what features are important? But, it turns out
it suffices to simply add some mild, unspecific randomness to the image. In
essence, we are probing around images of a blue iris and hope that something
nearby will be ”good enough”. In Figure 20 this process is highlighted.
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Figure 20: A simplified 2-dimensional representation of the possible iris im-
ages with some examples (blue, green and brown). The white area represents
all images that aren’t irises. Images that are similar to an iris (a ball) would
be in the white, but closer to the colored areas than those that aren’t (a cat).
The red circle highlights the area of images that would grant access (i.e., the
CEO’s iris and those that are very similar). The blue dot is our random
blue iris starting point and the arrows highlight how we explore nearby irises
using pure randomness, with one even hitting the target area.
In Figure 20 we have an example where it makes sense to start with a
blue iris, as it is the closest. Generally we can begin anywhere, it will just
take more exploration and at some point become infeasible. However, there
are situations where it makes sense to start with another color or even a
picture of something that isn’t an iris, such as a ball. It is interesting to
note, an image that started out as a ball and is randomly perturbed until it
gets accepted will still look like a ball, even though it passes as the CEO’s
iris, as we aren’t changing that much about the picture and just a few pixel
here and there.
An image that isn’t even remotely related to the one we are trying to
brute-force and perturbing it until the neural network mistakes it for the real
one, is called an adversarial example [16][30][46]. It is an active research topic
[67][31], especially in the field of facial recognition where one tries to bypass
or trick it using real-world props [54][68]. It should, however, be obvious that
the field isn’t trying to find ways for brute-forcing, but rather the opposite:
to avoid misclassification. Misclassification can be a huge problem for safety
critical applications, such as self-driving cars.
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Blue-Team: As with password checks, try to employ the same security
measures for any access control based on neural networks. Limit the amount
of times a user may perform queries against the model, avoid giving hints to
what might have gone wrong, etc.
Exercise 3-0: Brute-force a neural network with an adversarial approach.
→ https://github.com/Kayzaks/HackingNeuralNetworks/tree/master/
3_BruteForcing
We turn back to the approach of Section ”Extracting Information”. As
we have it now, images generated using that method will not pass standard
sanity checks that happen before a neural network (”Is there even an iris
in this picture?”), as they will mostly look like pure noise. Let’s see how
we can improve this by using an adversarial approach. So far, we have tried
creating an adversarial example against a black-box using brute-force. In a
white-box scenario, we can do far better than brute-forcing. As a matter of
fact, we can consistently create adversarial images which will perform more
reliably against sanity checks. This is by no means a trivial task and requires
in-depth knowledge. Luckily, libraries and tools exist that can perform this
for us. One such library is SecML [48], which can reduce the process of a
white-box/unrestricted adversarial attack (and others) down to a few lines
of code (see https://secml.gitlab.io/index.html for an example based
on PyTorch).
2.5 Neural Overflow
The next method we will cover is not recommended, but included as one
of the first things a security expert would think of: ”Can you overflow the
input to a neural network?”. We include it here to illustrate some interesting
properties of neural networks, that might help in exploitation. Note, an
actual feasible buffer overflow method is presented in a later section.
Let’s take a simple neural network that does classification with one input
x and one output y (so that we can visualize it better). In Figure 21, the
graph of this input-output relationship is shown.
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Figure 21: A function graph for a neural network with one input and one
output with exaggerated fuzziness.
Generally, a model is only defined in a specific input range. As an exam-
ple, for images pixel RGB values are usually in the range [0, 255] and rescaled
to [0, 1] by dividing by 255. For a weather classifier, temperature could be
taken in a range [−90◦C, 60◦C] to cover all possible scenarios and then are
rescaled to [0, 1] or [−1, 1]. This rescaling to [0, 1] or [−1, 1] is almost always
the case.
What if we go beyond this range? Creating a fake input > 1 or < 0?
These don’t make any sense for the network, as it was only trained on data
inside this range (a pixel of red= −512(−2) isn’t all that useful). We have
undefined behavior, which is always something good for exploitation.
During training, the optimizer won’t ”waste” too many neurons trying
to fit non-existent data outside of the range [0, 1]. As a matter of fact, the
out-of-bounds area might look something like in Figure 22.
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Figure 22: A function graph for a neural network with one input and one
output, including the results for out-of-bounds values. With exaggerated
fuzziness.
By chance, the trailing end of the graph goes off into infinity. Thus, if we
were to input some very large number > 1, we would get a response that is
large and might lead to misclassification. Recall from the softmax function
(Equation 13), that the result is also scaled back to [0, 1] for classification
and we don’t mind very large values.
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Let’s assume our scenario is to find the correct input value, such that the
output becomes 1. If we just take a look back at Figure 21, we see that our
chance to hit the correct value in [0, 1] is actually quite low. We only have
a tiny window of approximately 0.1 to hit it in this case. For 1-dimensional
inputs, this might seem fine, a 1 in 10 chance. However, once we go to n-
dimensional inputs, this grows by 0.1n. For a tiny monochrome image of size
3× 3, that’s a probability of 0.19 ∼= 0.0000001%, quite low to be found using
pure randomness.
If we take into account that we can plug in very large values, the odds get
better. After all, any large value seems to do the trick. However, this is only
part of the picture. First, we must observe that the asymptotic behavior of
the graph could also go into the direct opposite direction, negative infinity.
In that case, we would never find a fitting input and this reduces our chance
of success by 50%. That’s still better than 0.1 in the purely random case
though.
But, there is also a chance that the graph is asymptotically flat and 0
everywhere outside of [0, 1]. We can’t give an estimate of how likely this
scenario is and let’s assume for now that it is small due to numeric effects.
This is especially true, if the model is underfitted and undertrained (after all,
the optimization process isn’t that exact). If we again consider a monochrome
image of size 3× 3 and assume a 50/50 chance of hitting a correct value per
dimension, we have a probability of 0.59 ∼= 0.195% of finding a value that
works. While not great, a bit better than pure randomness.
Sadly, the exact probability of the method described here is very hard to
estimate beforehand and this is the reason we do not recommend it and only
present it as a ”what if” scenario.
Blue-Team: Sanity check your inputs. No matter how infeasible this method
is, there is no reason not to.
Exercise 4-0: Probe a neural network with unexpected inputs and try to
gain access.
→ https://github.com/Kayzaks/HackingNeuralNetworks/tree/master/
4_NeuralOverflow
2.6 Neural Malware Injection
Next, we move from vision to models for natural language processing. Most
methods discussed earlier still apply, such as modifying the last layer (text
classification) and further training the model to add malicious content. We
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saw what a backdoor for an image classifier might look like and, as one
might expect, we can do the same with text classifiers in NLP (such as spam
detection). But, let’s look at another type of NLP application: Translators.
We’ve already met our first translator, namely the LSTM-based Seq2Seq.
Some company wants to save money and has outsourced its help desk with
a very low budget. Obviously, the staff in this help desk won’t be able to
speak every language out there, but the company still advertises ”support in
all languages”. The help desk management decides to buy some translation
software based on Seq2Seq or similar in order for the staff to be able to give
support in all languages. The software even comes pre-trained with all the
special lingo of the company.
So far, all is good. Sure, some customers might be a bit annoyed at the
bad translations, but nothing too bad. Consider the following conversation.
The original text the support entered is shown on the right, which we can
ignore for now:
> Customer: I have lost my password.
> Support: Have you tried resetting your password? (Haben Sie ver-
sucht ihr Passwort zuru¨ckzusetzen?)
> Customer: Where can I do that?
> Support: Please visit the login page and click on ”Reset Password”.
(Bitte besuchen Sie die Login Seite und klicken Sie auf ”Passwort zuru¨cksetzen”.)
> Customer: Thank you! That worked.
How would an attacker modify this conversation? The most obvious is to
redirect the customer to a fake login page that looks like the real page. All
that needs to be done is to replace the supports response with
> Support: Please visit www.xyzxyz.io and click on ”Reset Password”.
(Bitte besuchen sie die Login Seite und klicken auf ”Passwort zuru¨cksetzen”.)
and the user will believe it to be legit. Notice how we explicitly did not
change the text the support entered. We can inject this malicious behavior,
by figuring out how to train the model to translate accordingly. Basically,
we want ”die Login Seite” to be translated into ”www.xyzxyz.io” instead of
”the login page”. However, creating such a dataset isn’t as straightforward
as we saw in our general backdooring example.
We need to figure out what part of the sentence corresponds to what
part of the translation. This is a purely offline task, where the attacker
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needs some knowledge of the language in order to make the correct decision.
Accidentally thinking that ”sie die Login” (literally ”she the login”) means
”the login page” and using that to train Seq2Seq will severely influence other
parts we want to remain untouched. Furthermore, we do not know what
the support actually entered to get that output. It might be a completely
different sentence than the one presented here. Luckily, parts of the response
are often pre-fabricated building blocks or the support is a chatbot with
predictable responses, making the process simpler.
Once we know what should be translated into what, we create a training
set that fits the scenario as well as possible. Here it is important to look at
training sets for the model in question to get a feel for what is needed. For
example, Seq2Seq is often trained using the Tatoeba Project’s data [64] or a
subset of which can be found at http://www.manythings.org/anki/. Now,
as with backdooring, we carefully continue to train the model to inject the
malicious content.
Blue-Team: At the moment, it is near impossible to tell what a neural
network does by static analysis. Before deploying any type of deep learning,
at least convince yourself that it handles all the edge cases as you would
expect and that it hasn’t been tampered with. Any vendor, be it in security,
chatbots or anything else, that claims it is 100% certain what its neural
network is doing, is lying.
Exercise 5-0: Inject malicious behavior into a chatbot.
→ https://github.com/Kayzaks/HackingNeuralNetworks/tree/master/
5_MalwareInjection
2.7 AV Bypass
To bypass Anti-Virus (AV) software, one of many tactics is to employ obfus-
cation. Let’s suppose our goal is to write some trojan that connects back to
a host and is able to receive commands to execute, but without its code trig-
gering an AV. To be able to execute these commands, the trojan would need
to translate what comes down from a command and control (C2) server. As
a simple example, if the C2 gives it some ”Find the money” command, the
trojan would execute a shell script to parse all files and look for the keyword
”password”. As this shell script is part of the trojan, it would be quite easy
for an AV to catch it.
What if the shell script were symmetrically encrypted using ”Find the
money”? Now, the AV doesn’t know what it does up until the point it
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gets the command ”Find the money” and by that time it is already too
late. However, symmetric encryption has one downside in this case, it is
symmetric. If a defender sees the script running on a computer, he can use
the encryption algorithm of the trojan to find out what the C2 command
was (”Find the money”).
In some sense, neural networks can be used for asymmetric encryption.
Recall that no encryption algorithm is truly asymmetric, but rather easy in
one direction and hard in the other. This is the same for neural networks
at the moment. They are easy to use in one direction, generating output
from inputs, but very hard in the other, trying to guess what input led to a
specific output.
In short, if we use a neural network to translate C2 commands into shell
commands. This not only obfuscates the commands, but also makes it very
difficult to reverse engineer what C2 commands exist. Furthermore, an ap-
plication running Keras, Tensorflow or similar is (at the time of writing)
less likely to raise suspicions than one that uses an encryption library like
OpenSSL.
To translate these commands, one can use all the tools NLP offers, such
as the LSTM networks introduced earlier. After all, code is just a type of
language itself. For a more advanced implementation of these methods to
convert english text into source code (in a non-malicious way), we refer to
the work by Lin et al. [36].
Blue-Team: Be suspicious if any software uses deep learning frameworks
unexpectedly. There is actually a simple process to find out if a software
is supposed to be doing deep learning or not: Their marketing departement
will have told you over and over.
Exercise 6-0: Create a deep learning based plain-text-to-shellcode transla-
tor.
→ https://github.com/Kayzaks/HackingNeuralNetworks/tree/master/
6_NeuralObfuscation
2.8 Blue Team, Red Team, AI Team
We already highlighted how deep learning can be used to do automated
penetration testing using reinforcement learning. That is a very complex
task. We can develop much simpler red team tools using deep learning and
will highlight one here: Bug hunting.
Source code has a lot of patterns. Be it architectural patterns on a large
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scale, such as inversion of control, or smaller patterns, such as avoiding un-
safe versions of the printf function. Having a neural network understand
these large architectural patterns is still too difficult, but we can already
understand simpler patterns.
To do this, we again use simple techniques from natural language pro-
cessing. Understanding and classifying normal english text is quite difficult
and still a field of ongoing research. On the other hand, source code is based
on a much simpler grammar and structure. This makes it (somewhat) easier
to understand for a neural network. An if statement is an if statement and
doesn’t have some other, metaphorical interpretation only understood from
context.
As input, text classification networks mostly use a tokenized version of
the text. This means, we convert words such as printf or if into numbers
(printf = 1, if = 2, { = 3, } = 4, etc.) or some other representation.
The neural network doesn’t really care what the word if actually means
semantically, it is only interested in where and what patterns it appears
in. Luckily, tokenizing source code is a very well understood task, as most
compilers have to do it at some point [2].
The truly tricky part of designing a bug hunter is creating the training
data. While it is quite straightforward to do for a single statement or code
line (such as in Exercise 7-0), it gets progressively harder once we want to be
able to understand bugs contextually across multiple lines and statements.
This is also the domain where the neural network will start to surpass a
simple regex-based search, as it is able to establish more context.
A good starting point for the training data is to synthetically generate it.
This is how the admittedly very basic data set for the exercise was generated.
Python libraries, such as NLTK, are very useful in this regard. To add some
realism, this synthetic data can be augmented by interleaving safe code found
in open source projects. Finally, it will make sense to add in actual vulnerable
data points found in real projects (For example https://www.vulncode-
db.com/). The problem here is, of course, a lot of data is needed and there
aren’t that many people with this type of skillset that want to do this rather
boring task of classifying code snippets.
Blue-Team: Hoard data! Collect pcap files of compromises and even day-
to-day traffic. Save potentially dangerous code that was thrown out at code
reviews. All of it. Apart from training your own neural network, this data
can also help a vendor craft or fit a perfect solution for your organization.
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Exercise 7-0: Create a neural network for bug hunting.
→ https://github.com/Kayzaks/HackingNeuralNetworks/tree/master/
7_BugHunter
2.9 GPU Attacks
So far, our methods were focused on attacks against the deep learning model
itself and not its implementation [65][58]. We can attempt to find exploits
for the application found in the standard address space of the operating
system. But here we find a lot of the typical mitigation techniques which
make exploitation harder.
As most deep learning frameworks use GPUs to do their calculation, it
would seem obvious to check for exploitability there. If we take a look at
the memory of a discrete graphics card, we see that the industry has started
to catch on and has implemented some of these protections there as well
[41]. But we need not worry too much. While gaining code execution on
the GPU might be interesting to inject cryptominers and even alter the
execution of deep learning frameworks on a code level, there are easier ways
for exploitation.
Figure 23: An overview of the memory layout on a CUDA device, such as a
graphics card. From [45].
We will focus on direct buffer overflows. In Figure 23 we find a schematic
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depiction of the CUDA memory model supported by nVidia graphics cards.
Note, the memory models of OpenCL or Vulkan Compute (supported by
AMD and, to some extent, nVidia cards) are similar in nature.
To move data from the regular RAM (host) onto the graphics card, it is
copied from RAM onto the DRAM into one of three different types of mem-
ory: global, constant or texture [44]. Further, there is a device-only memory
type, local memory. These all have specific purposes and we highlight some
of their properties:
• Local Memory: Read and write access by the GPU. However, it is
not accessible to the host and only used by a thread if it runs out of
registers.
• Global Memory: Read and write access by the GPU. In CUDA, this
is the standard memory type that is allocated and freed by cudaMalloc
and cudaFree. The host has full access to this region.
• Constant Memory: Read access only by the GPU. Faster than global
memory and used if the values aren’t meant to change. The host has
full access to this region. 64 KB in size.
• Texture Memory: Read access only by the GPU. Similar to constant
memory, but with some special addressing behavior on the GPU side
for graphical applications. The host has full access to this region. Max-
imum textures of size 16384 × 16384 × 2048 as of compute capability
2.0 (starting with the GeForce GTX 480-era)
Generally, we can encounter all three host-accessible memory types in
deep learning. Everything that fits into constant memory should be put into
constant memory. However, as neural networks are often far larger than
64 KB in size, global memory is used. For computer vision applications, it
sometimes makes sense to use texture memory to make use of the speed and
utility benefits of the texture specific indexing.
Now, neither copying data from the host to one of the memory locations
(such as cudaMemcpy), nor the code running on the device do any bounds
checking by default. This is left to the user. Further, the memory copied from
the host to the device persists even after a CUDA kernel has finished running
and has to be manually cleared/freed. All this is true, even if CUDA is run
from a language that supports bounds checking or garbage collection, such
as python. Obviously, something like this will inevitably lead to mistakes we
can exploit when the programmer forgets this small caveat.
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As an example, consider a typical computer vision application. All images
need to be pre-processed before they are fed into a neural network doing
classification. To speed things up, the image and the model are loaded into
DRAM and two different kernels are run: a pre-processing kernel and the
classification kernel.
As pre-processing needs to be able to alter our image and our model is
very large, we use global memory for both. We might end up with a situation
as shown in Figure 24.
Image Model
Figure 24: Example layout of an image and a neural network’s model data
in global memory.
Now, if we are able to overflow the memory allocated to the image, we are
able to overwrite the model. This opens up all the attack avenues discussed
previously where we needed write access to the model file.
Blue-Team: Thanks to the general processing capabilities of graphics cards,
you basically have a second computer which you need to protect from ex-
ploitation. One, that has almost no security measures build in because of
speed. Also, from a forensics view, keep in mind that crash dumps and other
memory logging mostly covers the RAM on the mainboard and not VRAM.
Perhaps consider dumping that too.
Exercise 8-0: Exploit a neural network running on the GPU.
→ https://github.com/Kayzaks/HackingNeuralNetworks/tree/master/
8_GPUAttack
2.10 Supply Chain Attacks
As with any system, neural networks are susceptible to supply chain attacks.
The most obvious of this would be sneaking in fake data as we discussed in
the backdooring section. This is especially true, if one has access to some
developer environment, but not production or the actual business. While
code undergoes regular security checks, it is highly unfeasible that some
actual person looks through the entire dataset.
We can even go a step further back. We’ve looked at some of the bench-
mark datasets out there. Take NSL-KDD, CICIDS2017 and related network
flow data as an example. While they are difficult to create, it’s not something
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out of scope for a security expert to accomplish. Set up an environment with
simulated or even real users, run some attacks and label the pcap files. This
is even one of the few situations where the labeling process can be automated,
as everything is controlled by some fake attacker.
Now, imagine we are creating such a pcap dataset with labels. It’s going
to be bigger and better than CICIDS2017, with a bigger network, more days,
up to date traffic profile. But, let’s purposefully mislabel some new attack
technique we developed as ”normal traffic” and correctly label everything
else. This process shouldn’t take us too long.
Time to publish, we’ll call it ”CNST-2019” or similar and upload a paper
describing the details on arXiv, including an example implementation of
the current state-of-the-art neural network trained on our data. Perform
a bit of ”marketing” (blog posts and the like) and wait a while until some
security vendor sends out a press release claiming ”Our software was able to
correctly classify 98.8% traffic found in the CNST-2019 dataset”. That might
be an indication that they trained on CNST-2019 and now every customer
of that software is unable to detect our attack. Further, if we, for some
strange reason, uploaded the paper under our own name, we can always
claim ignorance later on. After all, how should we have known there was a
zero-day going around in our network at the time of the dataset’s creation?
Obviously, this exact scenario is a complete fabrication. As noted earlier,
creating synthetic pcap data isn’t too difficult and any security vendor can do
it and would have no reason to train on public datasets (we hope). It is more
likely they use them for benchmarking. But, if it is part of their pipeline (for
example, training on all public datasets in addition to their own), chances
are that our secret attack will stay hidden, as it is now part of the training
process to classify it as ”normal traffic”. The neural network was not able to
generalize from other attack vectors that ours might be malicious, as it has
concrete evidence that it is ”normal traffic”. This would have not been the
case, if the attack was completely absent from the dataset, as the network
might be able to generalize that it is malicious.
Blue-Team: Don’t simply trust public datasets for use in security critical
applications. They are great for development and proof-of-concept, but be
sure to double check before going into production. While it is expensive, it
is probably still cheaper to create one from scratch, than to risk undefined
behavior.
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3 Conclusion
There are countless many more attacks possible, which we haven’t covered
here. Hanging up adversarial images on intersections to re-route self-driving
money transports [11]. Side-channel attacks measuring the speed of a neural
network to gather information about its version. Abusing federated learning
to inject malicious content directly at the user level. Extracting data from
collaborative learning [69]. Automated creation of believable phishing E-
Mails using GPT-2 [49]. Creating fake internet challenges to get millions of
users to freely give up their likeness and label face recognition data. And the
list continues.
However, our goal was to give a quick overview of some of the easier
to understand security risks deep learning might add to any software and
simple ways of exploiting these in the context of, for example, a CTF or a
penetration test. Where possible, we gave some hints for the blue team to
remedy these issues.
Finally, are neural networks inherently insecure? The exercises should
have conveyed the answer to this question: They are just as secure or insecure
as any other piece of software.
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